The Differenil Phrases in Dispute Jean-Fran~ois Lyotard
translated by Georges Van Den AbbeeJe "Jean-Fran,ois Lyolard is, with Jacques Derrida, Michel Foucault, and Gilles Oeleuze, one of the key figures in contemporary French philosophy. Like his immediate counterparts, he has been preoccupied with the present possibility of philosophical thought and its relation to the contemporary organization of knowledge. But, unlike them, he has been explicitly concerned with the ethical, social and political consequences of the options under investigation. In TIre Differelld, Lyolard subjects to scrutiny-from the particular perspective of his notion of 'differend' (difference in the sense of dispute)-the turn of all Western philosophies toward language; the decline of metaphysics; the present intellectual retreat of Marxism; the hopes raised, and mostly dashed, by theory; and the growing political despair. Taking his point of departure in an analysis of what Auschwitz meant philosophically, Lyotard attempts to sketch out modes of thought for our present."-Wlad Godzich
With its revised view of Kant, and its development of the consequences for aesthetics, The Differtlld is, by his own assessment, Lyotard's most important book. Two of his earlier works, Tile Postmodem COllditiOIl and Just Gamillg (written with Jean-Loup Th~b..,ud), were about what a postmodern philosophy sJwuld do; The Diffen!lld is an attempt to do such philosophy. The book was published in 1984 in France and this is its translation into English.
Jean-Fran~ois Lyotard is professor emeritus of philosophy at the University of Paris VIII and professor at the University of California, Irvine. His Postmodem COllditio" and JlIst Gamillg are both available in translation from Minnesota. Georges Van Den Abbeele is associate professor of French literature at Miami University, Ohio.
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The Differend: Phrases in Dispute
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The Differend Phrases in Disp_ut_e Jean-Frannist. I ha\'e said ""h)') do I understand the acl of a dlUllJmis. of a potency. or of a will of this potency. a deSire oflanguage to accomplish itself. But merely thai something takes place. This something is a phrase. undoubtedly (no. 99). Since a phrase presents a universe. for a phl1\SC' 10 take place is wl\at I call presentalion. 3.2. -Your -reading- seems akin 10 the meditation which. in On Timt' and &ing and the worts ofthat period, converges upon the notion of Ert'ignis (Heidegger, 1962: 10-23). _E"ceptlhat Heidegger's meditation persists in making "man-the addressee of the giving ....·hich in the £reigllis gives. and gives itsdf while withholding itself. and il panicularly persists in making the one who receives this giving into the man who fulfills his destiny IS man by hearing the authenticity of lime. Destiny. addressee. lIddreS5Of", and man are insances or relations here in unh'erses presented by phrases. they are situattonal, '0 logO. The 1ht're is lakes place. il is an occurrence (Ereignis). but it does IlOl pr-esenl anything to anyone. il does not presenl itself. and it is DOC the present, nor is it presence. Insofar IS it is phrasable (thinkable), a presentalion falls shoo. as an occurrence. 3. 3 -The question of time is raised here within the problemalics of the phrase. The GdHII (?) does 001 give (?) e"i5lents, it gives (?) phrases. which are distribulors of e"istents (instances in universes). Even phrases become e"islents for other phrases. But they "'have happened: as Aristotle says with respect 10 now. The presentalion islhat a phrase happens. BUI ~as such.- as whot. it is not within lime. ~Vulgar" time is within the universe presented by the phrase. There is 00 vulgar lime. though, as Dc:rrida is righlto say (Ibid.: M 59). or else, thaI's all there is. for lhe phrase is -vulgar too. 3.4 -Whal allows you 10 phrase somelhing 15 a presentation. if no one is its addressee and no one can refer to il without falling short of it? Are you. in your tum. making the 1I)·pothesis of a trace (Ibid.: 65ff.)? Of a silence or a blank Ihat effaces the event? Is the Ert'ignis in effect (Heidegger, 1953-1954: 22) the lightning flash that makes something (a phrase universe) appear, but blinds as it blinds ilselfthrough what il illuminales? Is this .....ithdrawal ilself a phrase (Nos. 22, llO)? Which of the four kinds of silence is it (Nos. 24. 26)'1 Or is this some other kind of silence':'-Il is another kind of silence. One thai docs not bear upon an instance in a phrase universe. but which bears upon the occurrence of a phrase. There would be no more prescnt3lions. -But you wrote: ~For Ihere to be no phra;.e is impossible- (No. 102)! _That's jusl il: the fccling thatlhe impossible is possible. l'lIalthe necessary is conlingcnl. Th3tlinkage must be Illude. bUllhatthere won'l be anythIng upon which to link. The -and~ with nothing to gnlb onto. Hence. notjuslthe contin~cncy oflhe how of linking, but the vertigo oflhe lasl phrase. Absurd. of course. But the lightning flash lakes place-it flashes and bursts out in the nothingness of the night. of c1uuus. or of the clear blue sky.
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760 PRESENTATION
120. There wouldn't be any space or time independent of a phrase. 121. Ifasked from where you hold this notion that space and time are like kinda of situations. it may be answered that it is held from phrases like 71le marquise went alit mfil'e*. It had happpened. He had arril'ed*·. Gel alit of"ere. Aslup! Already? etc. But above all from the phrase From where do )'011 ho'" .. 1 which presupposes space and time. And it may be added lhat I do not hold it, phrases can so hold themselves. that is. they can situate their instances so and situ. ate themselves so in relation 10 others. Space and time arc headings that group the situational effects produced in phrasc universes by expressions like behind, mudl later, jllsl below, was bom. ill the begilllling. etc. (and ere.). There are phrases whose regimen requires these marks (such as narratives). others which exclude them as an assumption (such as mathematics. or logic. even if there is a logic of time). 122. There arc as many universes as there are phrases. And as many situations of instances as there arc universes. -But you say that there are families of instantial situations such as space and time (No. 121)? Then, there are phrase universes that are at least analogous to each OIher?-A metalinguistic phrase has several of these different phrases as its referent. and it states their resemblance. This resemblance removes none of their heteogeneity (Bambrough, 1% I: 198-99). Space or time or space-time are family names allributed to these situations. No element is common to all. -Are you a nominalist?-No. resemblance may be established by the procedure for establishing the reality of a referent (Nos. 63ff.), but not by kuse.~ as Wittgenstein thinks. prey to anthropological empiricism. -But among the kinds of phrases required by this procedure. there is the ostensive. which makes use of spatio-temporal deictics, over there, then. etc.! -That only shows that metalanguage is part of ordinary language (Descles and Guentcheva Dcs~les. 1977: 7). 123. Isn't your way of partitioning phrase universes anthropocentric and prag· matic? From where do you hold it that they entail four instances?-From the way. to link. Take the phrase Oucll! You link onto the addressor with Are )'OU in pain?; onto the addressee with I elllli do (1Il)'lhillg abolll il; onto the sense with Does it hurt?; onto the rderent with 17,e gums are always l'ery sellsith'e. The instances are valences of linkage. -For human language perhaps. but what about a cat's ·u, mllr'l";U sonl" cinq hi'urI'S: since P~ul V~ltry, this senlence has served as Ihi' e~ample of c1ichC in the French no,<el. Cf. English: T",{IS
sition. and show itself 10 itself, know itself. in the identity (be it ephemeral) of a for-itself (far sieh) (pour-soil? Wilhout Ihis permutation. Ihere is according to Hegel only empty. subjective. arbilrary chatter. at best a regression to -ratiocinalivethought. to Ihediscourse of understanding. to the ~modesty~ of finilude. Now. Ihis finilude. he writes. because it is subjeclive vanity set up as an absolute. is -Wick· edness· (1830: § 386). Nevenheless. in declaring thai one must speak aboul ·Auschwitz· but that one can only speak about it truly if Ihe anonymous referent oflhe phrase becomes its addressee and addressor and thereup:>n -namcs~ itself. t?e summons to express me result of -Auschwitz- is an intimidalion (or notificallOn limima/;onJ) that prejudges the nature of the object. If the name hidden by -AuSChwitz- is the death of the magical. "beautiful dealh.~ how could Ihe latter. which sustains the speculalive movement. rise back up from its dealh in the camps? And. on the other hand. supp:>sing that ~afler Auschwitz~ speculative dis· COur~ had died. does it follow that it leaves place only to subjective chatter and the Wickedness of modesty? It is within speculative logic that this alternative is furrllUhucd. To accept it would be to perpetuate that logic. I~ it possible that some kind of phrase. in accordance wilh some other logic. ~ke~place -after- the anonym ~Auschwitz~ and which would not be its spcculatlve result? We would need to imagine Ihal the cleaving introduced imo Weslcrn
90 0 RESULT
M thought by "Auschwitz does not pass outside of speculative discourse, that il (since the latter has no outside). that it does not determine its effect inside that discourse in theguiseofan incomplete, invalid. or unexpressed way out. as a kind of neurotic fixation upon a figure (that ofMAuschwitzian~ death) which would only be, all things considered, but a moment. Rather this cleaving cracks speculative logic itself and not merely its effects, it jams the functioning of certain but not all of its operators. it condemns that logic to the disarrangement Idereglemem) of an infinity which would be neither the good one nor the bad one, or which would be both. 154. Scepticism. In making the name ~ Auschwitz" a model for and within negative dialectics, Adorno suggests that what meets its end there is merely allirmative dialectics... the Philosophical Propaedelllics. Hegel makes a distinction within logic betweca -the dialectical side or side of negative reason, and the speculative side or s' of positive reason- (1809: 12). This distinction is made again in the Encyclo~ dia: MIn the dialectical stage these finite determinations suppress themselves aad pass into their opposites I ... ). The speculative stage, or stage of positive son, apprehends the unity of determinations in their opposition -the affirmative. M which is involved in their disintegralion and in their transition (1830: § 82). This diSlinction is not respected everywhere in Hegel's opus. In fact. how could it possibly be respected in a discourse whose resource is found precisely in the negative as a magical affirmative force? What ought to be surprisi ralher. is that the opposition should have been made at all and that it should maintained apart from its own dialecticalization. like a concession made on side, though on a major point, to the understanding. This opposition is a trace, the scar of a wound in speculative discourse, a wound for which that discou is also the mending. The wound is that of nihilism. This wound is not an accide tal one, it is absolutely philosophicaL Scepticism (of the ancient kind. it shou be understood) is not just one philosophy among others; it is, writes Hegel i 1802, Min an implicit form [ . . . I, the free aspect of every philosophy.~ Hegel continues: Mwhen in a given proposition expressing reasoned knowledge, one haS isolated its reflective aspect. that is, the concepts enclosed within it. and when one considers the way in which these concepts are connected. then it necessarily appears that these concepts are sublated Irelel·es. aufgellObell) at the same time, or that they are united in such a way that they contradict each other; otherwise, the proposition would not be one of the reason, but one of the understanding(1802: 229). In § 39 of the 1830 £IIcycloplledia, Hegel refers to the 1802 article as though he still approved of it. In 1178. however, a stern corrective is placed upon the philosophical freedom to disintegrate detenninations: MScepticism. made a negative science and s1stem· atically applied to all forms of knowledge, might seem a suitable introduction,
RESULT 0 91
pointing out the nullity [Nichtigkeit) of such assumptions. But a sceptical in· ::oducdon would be not only an unpleasant but al~ ~ useless cours~; and that be· • uSC Dialectic, as we shall soon make appear, IS Itself an essefl{lQ{ elemen! of ~~rm{/til'f' science.- This c~rrective h~d.already been gi~en in the Introduction the Phenomenology of Mmd: -Scepllclsm always sees In the result only pure :~)lhillglll'SS, and abstracts from the fact that this nothing is determinate, is the othing of that ow of which il comes as a resull~ (137). n In the Phenomenology of Mind. the animals are given as examples of wisdom with regard to the truth of sense---certainty: they despair of the laller's reality and they cat it up (zehren sie auf) (159). Scepticism is unpleasant because it is the animality of the mind. its stomach, which consumes detenninations. Such is the wounding fascination exerted by nihilism, a consumption or consummation that lcaves no remains. The balm and the exorcism are as follows: to make this dis· tressing negativity work for the production of an affirmation. Is the anonym ~AuschwitzM a model of negative dialectics? Then. it will have awakened the de· spairofnihilism and it will be necessary Mafter Auschwitz" forthoughltoconsume its determinations like a cow its fodder or a tiger its prey, that is, with no result. In the sty or the lair that the West will have become, only that which follows upon this consumption will be found: waste matter, sh*t. So must be spoken the end of the infinite, as the endless repetition of Nichtige, as the "'bad infinity.- We wanted the progress of the mind, we got its sh*t. M What would a result of MAuschwitz consist in? What is a result? In the same paragraph § 82 of the Encyclop(ledia. Hegel goes on to write: "The result of Dialectic is positive, because it has a detenllined cO/Item, or because its result is not empry and abstract nothing. but the negation of certain specific determinlltio/lS which are contained in the result-for the very reason that it is a resultant and not an III/mediated flOthing. There is Resullllt because there is determination. But this determination is only determined, in turn, by the rules of that genre of discourse which is the speculative. M
lIegel I. In the preface to the Phenomenolog)' of Mimi. Hegel describes predication: on the one h.md, the Setb!1 (that which is in question. the subject of the proposition) constitutes the b:.se. &/Sis. or inert support; on the other hand. the contents attached to it obey a toand-fro movement, they do not belong to the Selbsl. they can be applied to other "bases" and give rise to other utterances. These utterances take the form of 3uributive judgments. ~nd the contents are their predicates. Such is the "rmiocinative- phrJse, (/(lS Rt/somriere/1. fhe philosophy of the understanding, in the Aristotelian and Kantian sense. is blocked. ~a~s Hegel. by the question: how can the relation (synthesis) between [he predicate and the ~ubject of a judgment be arbitrary'! Conceptual, Hgrasping~ thinking. dos begriefe/llJe D'·lIke.r. does not take as its subject the subject of the phr\Lllges between the others. Instead. it is the faculty oflhe milieu, within which every circ*mscription of legitimacy is caught fast. Furlhermore, this is the faculty which has enabled the territories and realms to be delimited. which has established the authority of each genre on its island. And this. it was only able to do thanks to the commerce or to the war it fOSlers between genres. >-'
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2. Passages. It is possible to specify some of the passages that constitute the archipelago. The transcendental illusion is one of its cases, an unhappy one. How do we know Ihat dialectical phrases. which have the fonn of cognitive phrases. are not cases of this? And Ihat the t~rri tory of the validity of reasoning does not thereby coincide with the realm oflhe understanding's legislation? Because, with respect to argumentative phrases, we cannot present an inluitable object. one gi\'en that is in space and time. Reason is impelled by its need (lkdur{nis) to maximaji*ze the concept and obeys -a merely logical prescription (~jM bloss logjsrh~ VQI'Schriftr (KRV: 307) to advance toward the unconditioned. Whal is presentable to the phrase of reason as an objec'l proper for its legitimation cannot be a phenomenon. Once the rule for fonni;lg the phrase has been identified (namely, that to reason is to conclude by means of a universal). the critique consists in playing out the rule for presenting il. after which the dialectical phrase will have been "isolated- (insulated) from the phrase: of Understanding. Transcendental illusion is IlOC for that matter dispelled. but it is located. The -as ir which is the source of this illusion is SCI aright. 1lle dialectical phrase acts as if it referm:lto phenomena. 1lle critique requires that il refer to·as if pbenomena.- To Symbols. that is. Another case. eminent and legitimate. of the operation of '"passages is indieated in § 59 of the third Critiqu~. where it is a question of showing thaI "the beautiful is the symbol \If'he morally good." The symbolizing oper.l.lion in general is twofold. and is called anal· Ugy. It consists in -first applying the conceplto the object ofa sensible intuition. and then applying the mere rule of the reflection made upon thai intuition to a quite different object uf which the first is only the symbol· (KUK: 197-98). Kant gives twO examples of this: a mere machine, the hand mill. may symbolize a monatchical State ·go....emed by an in· di\'idual absolute will·: a living bOOy may symbolize a monarchical State ·govemed by M
132 0 GENRE, NORM
national laws. MIn both cases. there is no resemblance between the symbolized ObjCC1 and the symbolizing object. which is Multerly different,- There is an identity, though, between the reflective rule applied to the lalter and the one applied to the fomler. The same goes f~r the relation between the beautiful and the good. Reflection is brought to bear on the feehngs (pleasure, respect) occasioned by objects respective to the two realms. and it discovers the same formal traits in them: immediacy. disinterestedneu freedom. universality. 1bese are then (according to the genre of transcendental discourse) the conditions a pn'ori for the possibility of those objects. Each trait, though. is applied different.ly in each, realm. Immediacy of feeling is required in the case of the beautiful by the senSible. and In the case of the good. it is required by the concept. In the judgmetl of taste, freedom is the freedom of the imagination coming into harmony with the concept; in the moraljudgmcnt, it is the freedom of the will coming into harmony with itself, etc. 1lle analogy at work here is 001 identical, however. to the analogy presented by the hand mill or living body as symbols of political regimes. It is impossible. in effect, to coasider the object of taste as a phenomenon on the same !e\'el as a hand mill or a living body. 1be latter can be gh'en through a Vusinnlichung lsensible illustration), an operation of sensibility in harmony merely with the laws of the understanding. but Sinnlichkcil (sensibility) and the undersunding are 001 sufficient to grasp (and therefore to constitute) !be object of taste. With the question of beauty. we are dealing with "the intelligible to whM:il ( . . . ) taste looks I ' . . ). In this faculty. the judgment does 001 see itself ( . . . I subjected to a heteronomy ofempirical laws I . . . ). It finds itself to be referred to ~ thing I . . , ) which is neither nature nor freedom. 1 . . . ) the supersensiblew(KUX: 199). If there is -sensat;oo- in the experience of the beautiful, it is in a sense ullerty differw ent from what is established in the Transcendental Aesthetic of the first Critique: wlf a detennination of the feeling of pleasure or pain is called sensation, this express;oo signifies something quite different from what I mean when I call the representation of a thing (by sense. as a receptivity belonging to the cognitive faculty) sensation~ (KUK: 40). If the beautiful symbolizes the good. then it is nOi because the aesthetic object is a phenomenon susceptible of a direct inlUition which can be substituted. by analogy. for the ethical object (moral act), for which no intuition is possible. Nor is the aesthetic object any more of an object of experience. nor is there any intuition. at least insofar as it is aes· thetic. Its fonn is perceptible. but the beauty of its fonn is not. Its aesthetic properties are not in itself. as givens. but in the feeling of taste, which obeys the four a prioris enumerated above. These are like the constitutive rules of the phrase (of feeling) which appraises beauty. The same rules arc found in the You oughllO. in the ethical phrase. in the feeling of respect. Butlhey are not applied to the same instances as in the aesthetic appraisal. What is felt immediately in the ethical phrase is nOithe object, but the law (the concept of practical reason): the addressee is not affected by the referent but by the sense. The addressor of the ethical phrase is not the imagination but the will, etc. Symbolization, then. docs not occur here through a substitution of objects, but through permutations of instances in the respective phrase universes, and without recourse 10 a direct presentation. The expeditions to neighboring islands undertaken by the faculty of judgment do not just bring back empirical data, but they even bring back rules of formation (phrdse families) and of linkage (genres of discourse), such as the four
GENRE. NORM 0 133
"doris. What allows the critical judge to say, This is Iltt' rnSf!-or the convicting cxhibit- is not necessarily a facl. r will not go back over that case of analogy which the type is for practical reason (Kant
fl
Notice 2. § 4). There arc other cases. of less repute but no less strange, such as that Mpassage- which Kant >,entures to present, in the first Critique. as an Mldeal of sensibility- and which he calls the ~mollOgramR (KRV: 487). This is. he wriles, M a blurred sketch drawn from diverse experiences. ~ Ran incommunicable shadowy image in the judgments of painters (and physw iOj;oomists). a -model (001 indeed realizable) of possible empirical intuitions. which Mfur_ ",~hes no rules that allow of being explained and examined. ~ Kant tums this evancSttnt something or other into a creation of tile imagination. This imaginary is 001, however. an Idea of the imagination; it is an Ideal. and an Ideal of sensibility, because it is a kind of S"hema-an Mas_ifschema- -of the Idea of the imagination in the realm (or field?) of sensible experience. Here again. it is 001 a rule, but an ~as·ifrule.- a regulative transport from the imagination to sensibiJity. And then, there is lil.i11 and even more simply the Idea of the imagination itself. constituted by a passage in reverse going from reason to the imagiI1cnts this as a contract between a buyer and a seller of "services." There is a difference. though, which has todo with 'real' time (Referent Section). A moment is s3id to be real when it is now and when it is chrononymically nameable (day, hour. minute). In the commodity/money exchange. only the moment of exchange is real: objects. which are so much abstract time, are exchanged now. on such a day. at such an hour. In the "work contract." the "service,~ which in principle is the exchanged object, is defined nOI only in abstract time (Ihe time of the wagecarner's past qualifications and the time of his or her future well-being and upkeep). but also in real time. The wage-earner will be here (at his or her workJXIst) and now (for every moment between such and such an hour, so many days per week. so many weeks per year). Partners in exchange may hope to gain time. one by selling. the other by buying, because they are exchanging abstract time. which is mobile in "real~ chronology and exchangeable at the right moment. In ceding real time. however, the wage-earner, remains riveted to the deictics of the employer's phrase (Yes, slhe's there) and to the calendar (Yes. slhe arrived at eight o'clock). Real lime cannot be moved about. Even if we supJXIse that the wage· earner gains more abstract time (as money) than he or she spends in real time to gain it (is this JXIssible?), it seems improbable that he or she would have the (real) time to spend the accumulated time. The problem seems analogous to the problem of narration in Tristram Shandy or in Butor's Passi1lg TIme: it takes more time to tell thc life of the narrator (as the hero of the story) than this life has really laken. It can only be hoped that the time stocked up in an opus is not lost for everybody.
248. Money can make advances in time because it is stocked-up time. Con. sumer c.redil (.intend~ f~r the buyer) allows one to anticipate the time of enjoy. ment; cIrculating credit (Intended for the merchant) to anticipate the time of pay_ ment (to the suppliers); investment credit (intended for the entrepreneur) to anticipate the time of production; creditor's credit (intended for the banker) to anticipa.te the time of the debtor's amortizing the debt. The lender gives time, sup" pressmg for the debtor the delay of time necessary to realize his or her transac_ tion. Money (lime in other words) is then itself taken as an "as-if commodity." Under the rule of e~changes, the cession of money presupJXISes, as always, a counter-cession. Here, what is ceded by the creditor is an advance of time. 1be assumption is that the counter-cession, the reimbursem*nt of the advance, is de. ferred for several e~change cycles (short, mean, or long term). Otherwise, there wouldn't be any advance. However. the lime of the exchanges during which the money is thereby blocked in the form of credit is so much time lost in relation to effective exchanges (hie et mmc), just as when it is blocked during production. This lost time in turn must be made up and annulled until the credit reaches its term. Interest discharges what is deferred, the time lost by the lender. 249. If work is considered as so much time lost for exchange. then it must be reduced as much as JXIssible. Exploitation. in the Marxian sense (the extraction of relative surplus-value. the only one pertinent to the economic genre), is one of the means of obtaining this reduction. There are others. But we see what the ideal of the genre is: to make up the lost time immediately. to anticipate. for ex. ample. the time lost in credit. To have the interest on a loan paid right away, as if the cycles to be lraversed up until its term had already passed by. This is also, for example. what is realized by self-financing business ventures: the profits earned from the sale of commodities arc incorporated back into the starting costs. They may be put back into the next circuit of exchange before the preceding one is completed. The smallest gap between phrase I and phrase 2 is sought after, but by making a paid for as if the gap were great. as if dead time had to be advanced for the paymcnt of a and as if y were supposed to acquit him- or herself not only for thc time incorporated into a but also for the time lost through the ex· tending of the credit. 250. Work is twice subject to the rule of exchange. Working conditions in a capitalist system all result from the hegemony of the economic genre. in which the issue is to gain time. By itself. work ignores these stakes (Nos. 243. 244). There is an insoluble differend between working and gaining time. The feelings (sadness. anger, hatred. alienation, frustration. humiliation) that accompany the
251. With capital. there is no longer a time for exchange. Exchange is the exchange of time, the exchange in the least JXIssible time ("real" time) for the greatest JXIssible time ("'abstract~ or lost time). Anything at all may be exchanged. on the condition that the time contained by the referent and the timc required for the exchange are countable. In communication theory. a unit countable in Boolean algebra has been determined for phrases in general, the bit of information. Under this condition, phrases can be commodities. The heterogeneity of their regimens as well as the heterogeneity of genres of discourses (stakes) finds a universal idiom in the economic genre. with a universal critcrion, success. in having gained timc; and a universal judge in the strongest money. in olher words lhe most creditable one. the onc most susceptible of giving and therefore of receiving time. Currency speculation, which shon-circuits production. is revealed to be the quickest procedure for accumulating time through exchange: you buy weak money on Friday and you sell it on Tuesday when it is steady. or simply because it has not been devaluated.
178 0 TtIE SIGN OF HISTORY
THE SIGN OF HISTORY 0 119
~52. The differe~s. belween ph~se ~imen.s o~ between genres of discourse are Judged 10 be negligible by the tnbunal ofcapItalism. The economic genre wjth ils mode of necessary linkage from one phrase-Io the next (Nos. 240. 241) dismisses Ihe occurrence. the event. the marvel, the amicipation of a community ~f feelings. -You'd never be done~ taking intooonsideration the incommensurability of the stakes and the void this incommensurability opens between one phrase and the next. Time is at its fullest with capitalism. But if the verdict. always pronounced in favor of gained time. puts an end 10 litigations. it may for that very reason aggravate differends.
ncs s that suspends and threalens the linkage from one phrase to Ihe next. be co\'crcd over in this way. by negotiation? Can the Come back implied in the rule of parity for cessions and counter-cessions neutralize the Is il happening? (Nos. 131. 132) in such a way that nothing else but the negotiable happens?
253. The economic genre's hegemony over the others can cenainly put on the garb of an emancipatory philosophy of hislory. More wealth. more security. more adventure, etc.. there's our answer to the canonical phrase of political ethics: What ought we 10 be? (No. 210; Kant Notice 4: § 2). This ethical question is not asked, however, in the economic genre. In it. you don't gain (you don't grab onto Ihe slakes) because you listened to the obligation and welcomed it. but because you've gained some time and are able to gain even more. Thus. the ec0nomic genre of capital in no way requires the deliberative political concatenation, which admits the heterogeneity of genres of discourse. To the contrary. it requires the suppression of that heterogeneity. It only tolerates it 10 the degree that the social bond is not (yet) entirely assimilated to the economic phrase alone (cession and eounter-eession). If this is one day the case. political institutions will be superfluous. as national narratives and traditions already are. But then. without the deliberative concatenation where the multiplicity of genres and their respective ends can in principle be expressed. how could the Idea of a humanity. which M is not the master of -its ends (a metaphysical illusion). but which is sensitive to the heterogeneous ends implied in the various known and unknown genres of discourse. and capable of pursuing them as much as possible. maintain itself'? And without this Idea. how would a universal history of humanity be possible? 254. In an exchange. the debt must be canceled. and quickly. In a narrative. it must be recognized. honored. and deferred. In a deliberation. it must be questioned. and therefore also deferred. (And thedifferend accordingly comes to light in deliberation. and even in narrative. or around it). Communities woven through narration must be destroyed by capital: "backward mentality.MAnd the questions that olher C-develope Throdor W. Adomo 1966.
N~g(lli",!
Dia/urics (IT. E. B. Ashton). New York. 1973.
Aeschylus. Agam/'lIIlWfl. in Al'Sch)'lus (lr. H. W. Smyth) Cambridge. Mass .. and London. 1951. Andr~-Marcel d'Ans 1978. 11 dif ,1l'S Vrais Hommr:s. Paris. Karl Quo Apel 1981. "La question d'une rondation ul1ime de la n1i50n.~ Crilique 413. Aristotle. "De inICrprC1.aliolle~ (Ir. J. L. Ackrill). in 71r,. Comp/n,. Works 01 ArisIOI/,.. ed. J.
Bames. Oxford. 1984. - - . Ml'lI/physics (Ir. W. D. Ros.~). in Comp/1'11' WQrks. - - . Ph)'si.-s (Ir. R. P. Hardie and R. K. Gayc). in Comp/,.u Works. ~_. Sophislrcol Rl'fuul/iOl's (Ir. W . A. Pickard-Cambridge). in Comp/l'll' WQrks.
__ • Rhnoric (Ir. W. Rhys Robc"s). in Camp/ell' Works. - - . Topics (tr. W. A. Pickard-Cambridge). in Comp/ell' Works.
Pierre Aubenque 1966. Le ProhIJm,. d,.l'tlr,. ch,.z Arislm,.. Paris. Erich Aucrbach 1946. Mimuis. n,l' Reprl'untmian 01 Rl'alil)' ill Wl'Slent UleryUltr,. (IT. W. Trask). Princelon. 1953. RcnFnrd Bambrough 1961. ~Universals and Family Resemblaoces.~ in Pilcher. cd .. WiltgMSll'ilt.
The Phi/oSQf>him/II1\·l'slighloo) Philadelphia. 1974. (1JIro,y oN1 Prac1iu) 1795. ~PerpelWlI Peace: (lr. 1.. W. Beck). in On HiS/cry (ali l784-a). (Proj«Y) 1796. ~Verkiindigung des nahen Ab5chlu»C$ eines Tr:al.:l.IlS wm ......-igen Friclkn in der Philo5ophie.~ in Gtsmnmtlft' Sdrriftt'n VIIl (lIS 171l8b). - - 17983. Mthropolog)""rom U ProglftlJfjc- Point of Vit'", (If. M. Gll':llor). The: Hague:. 1974. _ 1798b. ~An Old Qowion Raised Again: Is lhe Human Race Constantly F'rozrcssingT (Pan T....o of '"The: Conniel or llle: Facullies) (Ir. R. Anchor). in On I/ij/()l)' (as 1784a). (Conjfirr) _ 1959/60. "Krakauer Fragmenl zum 'Stteil der Fakultiilcn': in Po/ilisrht Schriftt'rr (Van der Gabltntz. ed.). Cologne: and Opladt:n. 1965. (Kf) Pierre Kaufmann 1967.1.'r.l/lhit'l1C't' imOfioollt'lIr dt' Ihfln 10 the Crilique of Hegers Philosophy of Law. IntrodlK1M>n: in ColJrard WOtts t1/ Kllrl Marx and Frrtkrid Engds. New York. 1975. Jcan·Luc Nancy 1983. UmphPlifCflt~goriqur. Paris. Pascal 1670. PttUirs (cd. L. L.afunu. ) (Ir. A. J. Krailsheimcr). Harmonds....orth. 1966. Robert Pingd 19110. L'apocr)p/rt. Paris. Plato. ApofOlY (tr. H. TrcOennkk), in CoIftc'lll DiafOlutS (td. E. Hamilton and H. Cairns). PTiDC'Cton. 1961. - - . Crat}~us (Ir. B. Jowrtt). in CoJ1«trd Dialogun. - - . EJ,thyJrmus (If. B. Jowell). in Dialogurs I. Ne.... Yori::. 1937. __ • Go,.,ias (Ir. W. D. Woodhead). in CoIl"wJ DiolagNtI. --.l.D"'S (lr. A. E. Taylor). in CoIItc'lrd Diafoguf'l. __ . Lt/r~,.., (Ir. L. A. ~). in CoIftc'lrd DialOluts. __ • Mtnt-Xtn/lS (Ir. B. JO....dt),in CoIItc'lrd Diofoguts. __ • PhatdrtlS (tr. R. Hackfonh). in Coflrclrd [)illfoguu. - . Tht Rtpublic (Ir. P. Shorey). in ColltCltd Dialoguts. _ . Tht Sophis/ (Ir. F. M. Comford). in Cofftc'ltd Diofoguu. _ . Tht Slaltsmun (tr. J. B. Skemp). in Collrcltd DialogutJ. _ . ThtOtlt/us (Ir. F. M. Corl1ford). in CoiltCltd Dialoguts. kan·Benoit Puceh 1982. Litultur suppos~. unpublished I)·pcseripl. Paris. Nicholas RC!lChcr 1967. Ttmporll1 Modalilits in Arab Logir. Dordrreh!. losette Rey·Dcbove 1978. Lt mholangagt. Paris. Clcll'ltnt Rossel 1976. rhl tI SOIl dooMt. Paris. David Roussel 1979. Lt pllrt lit ri/ pus. Paris. Bcnmnd Russell 1903. PriMiplrs "I MII/llt/mllics. London. 1959. M)' PhilosophiHlIDeI'tI""",,,,,,. London. lean·Michel Salanskis 1977. "Paradoxcs. sinllularites. syst~IlX'!i.~ Cri/iqut 361-62. Jean Schneider 1980. ~Lu logique sc:lf·rH~rentielle de 101 lempora1it~.~ unpublished typcscripl. Paris. GenNdc Sldn 1931. 110"'10 Wri/t (ed. P. Meyerowitz). New York. 1975.
u
Glossary of French Terms
Glossary of French Terms
AC:llld: current; in Frcnch.1hc adjecti.·( IICIwl means both ",hal is actual or real (as oppos«llO ..... hat is ~l)" poteIXiaJ) and .,;1'1.1 is current or occurrillJ -now.~ Boch KIl5eS arc implied in L)'OW'lf$
usc of tho: 1110«1. buI in ordtr jus( 10 lMinuin the 1.lIer IrnSC in Engloo. I have had to I~te _ t I as ·current- since ·currentness- scill implies an aetualiUlioll. whereas English "'actual- does IlOI necessarily imply the notion of wll:1I is happening -now.Aj(foccmt'nl: concatenation; an arrangmenl or aniculation of phrases in accordance Wilh the finality imposed by a genre of disoourse. Arrabonon-: to.set upon: a tec:hnical term which refers to the boarding of a ship by c~oms officials 10 check for and if neal be. 10 seize rorIIraband: the term i$ abo the iWldard Freoch lTaIISlalion oflhc: Hcidegerian llOfionof diu (;aII'll. lDdiljorgJly rendered illln EngIidl as ·cnframillJ-: -E... framing means the gatherina logdbeToflhal settina'upon thaI.sets upon man. i.e.• ellallmp him (orlh. to !"C,'eal.he real. in the mode or ordering, as standing-reserve· [Manin Hcidcggtt. 1lle
w. Lovin. in D. Krc:ll. cd. &uk Writings (New York: Harper and Row, 1977). p. 302]. Arrl\'f-l-II?: Is it Ilappening?; translatcs German Effignis; lhe French vC'm a,ril'tr means "to arrivC'" as ....1'11 as -to Ilappen.- WhilC' the lallC'r 5C'1\SC' predominatC's in the C'KprC'Ssion "arrivC'-I-il?," Lyourd oflC'n plays on lhe SC'nse of ....hal happcm as ..·hat co"," or am,'es (sec especially, No. Question Concerning T«hnology.-l',
In and the ~
pangnpll of!b(o -ruding dossiC'r'). Moo: BC'aulifu.t Death; heroic dC'ath, in ..·hich motUlity is 1ndC'd for immortality, Com11M' si: as if; InnslalCS Qcllllan ais 00. Connaissan«: most oftC'n tnnslated as "cognilion" (bill Ol:casioll3l1y as "knowledge-) 10 dislinguish II from Sil\'oir, lranslalcd uniformly as "knowledge": lranslalc~ German E,k,mmr;s. 8C'!~
Ot'mandC': requesL ~inabli"; addresstt. Dtsllnlueur: addressor.
DiIl'frC'nd: dilferend; !b(o FrendltaTll has btC'n re:l.lincd in lial of OI'IC' of iUi Engh~h equi\·a!C'nlS (dis-
193
19-1 0 GLOSSARY OF FRENCH TERMS
GLOSSARY OF I'RI:NOI TERMS 0 t95
pute. COnniCI. disagn:cmenl. difference of opinion. quarrel. or dissension) in order 10 allow lhe technical sense Lyotard is attributing to it. l>isrolU'!i (Jenre de): genre llf diSOO\l!"SC'. I>isposltlf: apparatus. I)ommal:f: damages: understood in tl1c legal sense of an injury for ..'hich legitimate gric"ance can be soug.llt. Eneha.iner. enchaineIDl'nt: 10 link. a linking or linkage: derived from 1M troet.aphor found in Kripkc (sec No. 57) of a -chain of communication- whereby unel'llOCes are linked or hooked onto each OIher as the silualion of cnuncialion changes or dcvelop.oi. Enjeu: stakes: "'hat one bets on. and. prcsIlmably. banks on. EIXKK'I (~jet dt r): subjttl of the Ullcrance. Enonciation (sujet lit I'); subjcn oflM uttering. lllc importanl semiol:ic distinction bct...·ecn IJto"d and htoIlritJlioIt goes back. of COU!"SC'. 10 Emile lkn'·cniste. Etanl: ellistenl: Innslatu Gcrtl13n ~indcs: I have dlsrcgudcd the frequent translation of this term by elllity since the laller is also pan of L)'llW'd"s vocabulary. Elrt; Bci"l: Innd.'lles German !kilt. Fin; mil: bOIh aim and termination. tlna1it!f; finality: tnnslales German Z..'«kMIJssigUif; the determination of SOI'DClhing in krms ofilS ·end'" or Jilt. t'oil;: time: time as OlXlJrrence in expressions like -one at a time- or -one time only-; 10 be (listi... guishcd from ''''"I's or time as temporality. ~nrt lit d~urs; genre of di5COUf'§C.
between -sense' and -referencc~: Frcgc's article has bc:cn cruei~1 in LyOlard's tbinking since at Icast Disrours. jigurt (Paris: Klincksicck. 1971). especially pp. 105-16. S
